This work aims to constitute an objective analysis of a German World War I naval combat commander within his proper context, by closely defining both the military-technical and military-political milieux in which Franz Hipper operated. The description of Hipper's actions in the battles of Dogger Bank and Jutland and his handling of communications, airships, and the new technologies of war demonstrate the importance of the military environment. The volume also provides a glimpse into the decision-making process involved in the construction of German battle cruisers and the impact these decisions had in combat.
From 1928 to 1943, Erich Raeder led the German navy during the last turbulent years of the Weimar Republic, the rise of Hitler, and through World War II, yet until now there has not been a full-length biography written about him. This study draws on archival resources and the rich scholarship of German naval history over the past five decades to review the evolution of Raeder's concept of naval strategy and his attempts to achieve the political and military means necessary to attain the navy's global naval ambitions. While previous histories have viewed Raeder as a product of the Wilhelmian era and heir to Admiral von Tirpitz's sea power ideology, this work clearly demonstrates the navy's affinity with Hitler's fascism. Author Keith Bird refutes Raeder's own argument that his navy was non-political and independent and shows him to be a political activist and the architect of German naval policy. For the first time, Raeder's strict leadership of the navy after 1928 and his relationship to Hitler and the National Socialist state is placed in the context of Raeder's formative years as an Imperial naval officer, his First World War combat experience, and his critical role in the survival and development of the post-war Reichsmarine. The author traces the impact of Hitler's influence on both the pace and nature of naval rearmament 1933-1939 and the conduct of the Kriegsmarine in war as well as Raeder's furtive attempts to influence Germany's strategic thinking in favor of a maritime strategy. Blinded by his need to justify the navy's existence and achieve his vision of world power, Raeder was ultimately defeated by the contradictions in his own policies as well as Hitler's and the realities of Germany's resources and military necessities.
The Battle of Jutland, May 31–June 1, 1916, pitted Great Britain and Imperial Germany—the two largest fleets of World War I—against one another for the first time. At that time, it would be the largest clash of capital ships in the history of modern naval warfare. Arguably, the outcome of World War I was at stake. Focusing on the many fine studies of naval encounters in the North Sea and the primary sources that appeared as the centennial of this clash approached, Eric Dorn Brose seized an opportunity to reexamine Jutland, its pre-history, and aftermath. Considering new scholarship within the context of extant literature, the author reveals why each side claimed a victory that belonged to Britain and its cautious admiral, Sir John Jellicoe by examining the key roles naval and political leaders in Germany and Great Britain played during the fight. With an awareness of previous research, and a lively, fresh approach, Brose provides a concise history of the Jutland clash and the era of naval combat itself.
From the beginnings of the age of sail and firearms to the present day, the Encyclopedia of Naval History provides a complete and comprehensive guide to world naval history.
Written by experts for use by nonexperts, this monumental work probes Germany's "Genius for War" and the unmistakable pattern of tactical and operational innovation and excellence evident throughout the nation's military history. Despite having the best military forces in the world, some of the most advanced weapons available, and unparalleled tactical proficiency, Germany still lost both World Wars. This landmark, four-volume encyclopedia explores how and why that happened, at the same time examining Germany as a military power from the start of the Thirty Years' War in 1618 to the present day. Coverage includes the Federal Republic of Germany, its predecessor states, and the kingdoms and principalities that combined to form Imperial Germany in 1871. The Seven Years' War is discussed, as are the Napoleonic Wars, the Wars of German Unification (including the Franco-Prussian War), World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. In all, more than 1,000 entries illuminate battles, organizations, leaders, armies, weapons, and other aspects of war and military life. The most comprehensive overview of German military history ever to appear in English, this work will enable students and others interested in military history to better understand the sociopolitical history of Germany, the complex role conflict has played in the nation throughout its history, and why Germany continues to be an important player on the European continent.
This is a major new naval history of the First World War which reveals the decisive contribution of the war at sea to Allied victory. In a truly global account, Lawrence Sondhaus traces the course of the campaigns in the North Sea, Atlantic, Adriatic, Baltic and Mediterranean and examines the role of critical innovations in the design and performance of ships, wireless communication and firepower. He charts how Allied supremacy led the Central Powers to attempt to revolutionize naval warfare by pursuing unrestricted submarine warfare, ultimately prompting the United States to enter the war. Victory against the submarine challenge, following their earlier success in sweeping the seas of German cruisers and other surface raiders, left the Allies free to use the world's sea lanes to transport supplies and troops to Europe from overseas territories, and eventually from the United States, which proved a decisive factor in their ultimate victory.
In August 1914, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz convinced the German armed forces to create a new unit, called the MarineDivision Flandern, to garrison the Belgian coastline and prepare naval bases in for the implementation of a naval guerrilla war against Great Britain. The Germans called their strategy Kleinkrieg, or little war, and they intended to whittle away at British naval superiority by using their submarines and destroyers. Later expanded into the MarineKorps, the unit soon found itself in the middle of a land war as well. What had been intended as a garrison unit found itself on the frontlines when the war stalemated. The British had traditionally seen Belgium as a dagger pointed at the throat of England, and the Royal Navy feared what use the Germans might make of the position. The result was an active naval campaign in the English Channel. Karau brings to light the contributions of the MarineKorps Flandern, a force often neglected by historians. He examines the role of the MarineKorps in both land and naval wars and reaffirms the increasingly important role played by aircraft in the Flanders theater. If Belgium was a weapon pointed at the British throat, were the Germans properly equipped to wield the dagger?
