In this comprehensive tour of the long history and philosophy of expertise, from ancient Greece to the 20th century, Jamie Carlin Watson tackles the question of expertise and why we can be skeptical of what experts say, making a valuable contribution to contemporary philosophical debates on authority, testimony, disagreement and trust. His review sketches out the ancient origins of the concept, discussing its early association with cunning, skill and authority and covering the sort of training that ancient thinkers believed was required for expertise. Watson looks at the evolution of the expert in the middle ages into a type of “genius” or “innate talent” , moving to the role of psychological research in 16th-century Germany, the influence of Darwin, the impact of behaviorism and its interest to computer scientists, and its transformation into the largely cognitive concept psychologists study today.
From the use of expert testimony in the courtroom to the advice we rely on to solve key economic, political, and social problems, expertise is an essential part of our decision-making process. However, the extent to which experts can be trusted is a subject of persistent and contentious debate. The Philosophy of Expertise is the first collection to explore the fundamental philosophical issues surrounding these authorities and their expert knowledge. Part 1 considers the problems surrounding the issue of trust and deference; part 2 launches a phenomenological clarification of expertise that pinpoints the universal structures embodied in cognition and affect; and part 3 examines the consequences of the social and technical externalization of expertise. Contributors including Edward Said, Alvin Goldman, Peter Singer, Hubert Dreyfus, Julia Annas, Harry Collins, and Don Ihde draw on a number of intellectual approaches to explore the justification of expert authority, the potentially dangerous role of expertise in a liberal democratic society, how laypeople can critique experts, and the social and ideological character of expert advice. The contributors also discuss the reasoning process of judges and juries, the ancient Greek view of moral conduct, and the incorporation of experts into governmental bureaucracy. By honestly tackling the legitimacy and consistency of various positions, this volume sheds much-needed light on the theoretical dimensions of a controversial and pervasive practice. Contributors: Alvin I. Goldman, Don Ihde, Edward Said, Evan Selinger and John Mix, Evan Selinger and Robert P. Crease, H. M. Collins and Robert Evans, Hélène Mialet, Hubert Dreyfus, John Hardwig, Julia Annas, Paul Feyerabend, Peter Singer, Scott Brewer, Steve Fuller, Steven Turner
Philosophical questions surrounding skill and expertise can be traced back as far as Ancient Greece, China, and India. In the twentieth century, skilled action was an important factor in the work of phenomenologists such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty and analytic philosophers including Gilbert Ryle. However, as a subject in its own right it has, until now, remained largely in the background. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise is an outstanding reference source and the first major collection of its kind, reflecting the explosion of interest in the topic in recent years. Comprising thirty-nine chapters written by leading international contributors, the Handbook is organized into six clear parts: • Skill in the history of philosophy (East and West) • Skill in epistemology • Skill, intelligence, and agency • Skill in perception, imagination, and emotion • Skill, language, and social cognition • Skill and expertise in normative philosophy. Essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of mind and psychology, epistemology, and ethics, The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise is also suitable for those in related disciplines such as social psychology and cognitive science. It is also relevant to those who are interested in conceptual issues underlying skill and expertise in fields such as sport, the performing arts, and medicine.
Section I examines historical philosophical understandings of expertise in order to situate the current institution of bioethics. Section II focuses on philosophical analyses of the concept of expertise, asking, among other things, how it should be understood, how it can be acquired, and what such expertise warrants. Finally, section III addresses topics in bioethics and how ethics expertise should or should not be brought to bear in these areas, including expertise in the court room, in the hospital room, in the media, and in making policy. 2. A GUIDED HISTORICAL TOUR As Scott LaBarge points out, Plato’s dialogues can be viewed as an extended treatment of the concept of moral expertise, so it is fitting to begin the volume with an examination of “Socrates and Moral Expertise”. Given Socrates’ protestations (the Oracle at Delphi notwithstanding) that he knows nothing, LaBarge observes that it would be interesting to determine both what a Socratic theory of moral expertise might be and whether Socrates qualified as such an expert. Plato’s model of moral expertise is what LaBarge calls “demonstrable expertise”, which is concerned mainly with the ability to attain a goal and to explain how one did it. The problem with this account is that when one tries to solve the various problems in the model – for example, allowing that moral expertise is not an all-or-nothing skill – then one is immediately faced with the “credentials problem”. As LaBarge puts it, “. . .
How do historians, comparative linguists, biblical and textual critics and evolutionary biologists establish beliefs about the past? How do they know the past? This book presents a philosophical analysis of the disciplines that offer scientific knowledge of the past. Using the analytic tools of contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science the book covers such topics as evidence, theory, methodology, explanation, determination and underdetermination, coincidence, contingency and counterfactuals in historiography. Aviezer Tucker's central claim is that historiography as a scientific discipline should be thought of as an effort to explain the evidence of past events. He also emphasizes the similarity between historiographic methodology to Darwinian evolutionary biology. This is an important, fresh approach to historiography and will be read by philosophers, historians and social scientists interested in the methodological foundations of their disciplines.
In The Philosophical Structure of Historical Explanation, Paul A. Roth resolves disputes persisting since the nineteenth century about the scientific status of history. He does this by showing why historical explanations must take the form of a narrative, making their logic explicit, and revealing how the rational evaluation of narrative explanation becomes possible. Roth situates narrative explanations within a naturalistic framework and develops a nonrealist (irrealist) metaphysics and epistemology of history—arguing that there exists no one fixed past, but many pasts. The book includes a novel reading of Thomas S. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, showing how it offers a narrative explanation of theory change in science. This book will be of interest to researchers in historiography, philosophy of history, philosophy of science, philosophy of social science, and epistemology.
The relationship between philosophy and history has long been a matter of contention. Philosophers have claimed that their pursuit of universal law and eternal verities elevated them beyond historians, who merely dabbled with the vagaries of the particular and the contingent. Historians responded with the argument that philosophy was important only in relation to its contribution to concrete, historical truth. A greater challenge for both philosophers and historians than the defense of either of these positions has been to understand the convoluted issues surrounding the intersection of their respective disciplines. In At the Nexus of Philosophy and History, Bernard P. Dauenhauer has collected eleven essays that explore the relationship between the two disciplines and provide a significant, innovative response to the problems created by such exploration. The original essays collected in this volume challenge the artificial distinctions and disciplinary parochialism that have too often characterized traditional academic debate. Instead of advancing any one elaborate theory, At the Nexus of Philosophy and History seeks to encourage a balanced approach toward the exploration of the two fields by demonstrating that a full understanding of the one is impossible without knowledge of the other.
Western philosophers have traditionally concentrated on theory as the means for expressing knowledge about a variety of phenomena. This absorbing book challenges this fundamental notion by showing how objects themselves, specifically scientific instruments, can express knowledge. As he considers numerous intriguing examples, Davis Baird gives us the tools to "read" the material products of science and technology and to understand their place in culture. Making a provocative and original challenge to our conception of knowledge itself, Thing Knowledge demands that we take a new look at theories of science and technology, knowledge, progress, and change. Baird considers a wide range of instruments, including Faraday's first electric motor, eighteenth-century mechanical models of the solar system, the cyclotron, various instruments developed by analytical chemists between 1930 and 1960, spectrometers, and more.
"Knowledge, Reality, and Values" provides readings that reflect the history of philosophy as it spread from ancient Greece into the Muslim world of the Middle Ages, which in turn influenced the development of philosophy in Medieval and Enlightenment Europe. It presents a broad view of philosophy, including a diversity of viewpoints representing the complexity of both the analytic and continental philosophical traditions, and offers critical perspectives from feminism, postcolonial theory, and critical race studies. "Knowledge, Reality, and Values" introduces philosophy through concise selections representing the diversity of philosophical thought, from ancient Greek philosophy through contemporary work in metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. The text highlights a variety of contemporary approaches, including analytic philosophy, American pragmatism, and existentialism. Beginning with a section on critical thinking, introducing deductive validity and soundness and inductive reasoning, "Knowledge, Reality, and Values" equips the student with the reasoning skills needed to comprehend and assess the readings. "Knowledge, Reality, and Values" is best suited for introductory undergraduate courses in general philosophy, ethics, and social and political philosophy, as well as for continuing education courses and the interested casual reade b>Jamie Lindsay holds an M.A. from San Francisco State University and an M.Phil. from the Graduate Center, City University of New York, where he is currently working towards his Ph.D. He teaches Political Philosophy, Social Philosophy, and Ethics courses at Hunter College and Brooklyn College, where he has also taught within the SEEK Program and College Now. Dena Shottenkirk, a Lecturer at Brooklyn College, received her Ph.D. from the Graduate Center, City University of New York. She also holds an M.F.A. in visual art from Mason Gross School of the Arts, Rutgers University. Shottenkirk exhibits her artwork and disseminates her writings under the banner of The System Project.
This is a collective study of philosophical questions to do with experts and expertise, such as: What is an expert? Who decides who the experts are? Should we always defer to experts? How should expertise inform public policy? What happens when the experts disagree? Must experts be unbiased? Does it matter what the source of the expertise is?
