As central bank digital currency (CBDC) projects progress around the world, there is increased need for a project management methodology that is appropriate for CBDC. This paper develops a CBDC-specific project management methodology that establishes a common terminology and offers guidance to development teams on best practices for addressing the complex requirements and risks associated with CBDC. It is centered on an original five-step approach called the “5P Methodology”: preparation, proof-of-concept, prototypes, pilots, and production. The methodology emphasizes a phased approach to CBDC research and development, with strong focus on research preparation, experimentation and testing, risk management, stakeholder engagement, and cyber resilience.
We study the optimal design of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) in an environment where agents sort into cash, CBDC and bank deposits according to their preferences over anonymity and security; and where network effects make the convenience of payment instruments dependent on the number of their users. CBDC can be designed with attributes similar to cash or deposits, and can be interest-bearing: a CBDC that closely competes with deposits depresses bank credit and output, while a cash-like CBDC may lead to the disappearance of cash. Then, the optimal CBDC design trades off bank intermediation against the social value of maintaining diverse payment instruments. When network effects matter, an interest-bearing CBDC alleviates the central bank's tradeoff.
This paper marks the launch of a new IMF series, Fintech Notes. Building on years of IMF staff work, it will explore pressing topics in the digital economy and be issued periodically. The series will carry work by IMF staff and will seek to provide insight into the intersection of technology and the global economy. The Rise of Digital Money analyses how technology companies are stepping up competition to large banks and credit card companies. Digital forms of money are increasingly in the wallets of consumers as well as in the minds of policymakers. Cash and bank deposits are battling with so-called e-money, electronically stored monetary value denominated in, and pegged to, a currency like the euro or the dollar. This paper identifies the benefits and risks and highlights regulatory issues that are likely to emerge with a broader adoption of stablecoins. The paper also highlights the risks associated with e-money: potential creation of new monopolies; threats to weaker currencies; concerns about consumer protection and financial stability; and the risk of fostering illegal activities, among others.
In the ever-evolving landscape of global finance, the rise of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) has introduced a myriad of challenges that demand immediate scholarly attention. The accelerating pace of digital transformation, coupled with the intricate dynamics of these novel currencies, poses significant hurdles in their widespread adoption. From privacy concerns to the technological complexities involved, the academic community finds itself at the forefront of deciphering the multifaceted challenges inherent in the CBDC landscape. Addressing this imperative need for comprehensive analysis is the groundbreaking publication, Exploring Central Bank Digital Currencies: Concepts, Frameworks, Models, and Challenges. Within the pages of this compelling work, scholars will encounter a meticulous exploration of the intricate evolution of money, navigating from traditional barter systems to the digital era. The catalytic role of Bitcoin in reshaping the financial landscape serves as a cornerstone, laying the foundation for a profound understanding of the cryptocurrency fundamentals that underpin CBDCs. This book delves into the conceptual frameworks and technological models shaping CBDCs, aiming to illuminate the complex challenges faced by central banks, governments, and financial institutions in their pursuit of digital currency integration.
Among the countries that have launched central bank digital currency (CBDC) or are conducting large-scale pilots, adoption remains slow and limited due to various challenges such as lack of public awareness and trust, preference for existing payment methods, and inadequate incentives for intermediaries. Central banks cannot take it for granted that CBDC, once launched, will be adopted and scaled up easily. Forming part of the CBDC Virtual Handbook, this paper aims to encourage policymakers to consider CBDC adoption early on, by arguing that successful CBDC adoption hinges not only on technical readiness and operational robustness, but also on strategic policy and design choices that target end-user and intermediary involvement from the outset. The paper introduces The REDI Framework which outlines various regulatory strategies, education/communication initiatives, design/deployment choices, and incentive mechanisms to prepare for CBDC adoption.
New technologies are driving transformational changes in the global financial system. Virtual currencies (VCs) and the underlying distributed ledger systems are among these. VCs offer many potential benefits, but also considerable risks. VCs could raise efficiency and in the long run strengthen financial inclusion. At the same time, VCs could be potential vehicles for money laundering, terrorist financing, tax evasion and fraud. While risks to the conduct of monetary policy seem less likely to arise at this stage given the very small scale of VCs, risks to financial stability may eventually emerge as the new technologies become more widely used. National authorities have begun to address these challenges and will need to calibrate regulation in a manner that appropriately addresses the risks without stifling innovation. As experience is gained, international standards and best practices could be considered to provide guidance on the most appropriate regulatory responses in different fields, thereby promoting harmonization and cooperation across jurisdictions.
The IMF is frequently approached by central banks seeking guidance on the balance between central bank digital currency (CBDC), fast payment systems (FPS), and electronic money (e-money) solutions. Common questions arising include: Do central banks need a CBDC when already equipped with other well-established digital payments systems? For central banks with less-developed solutions: Should central banks establish one system over the other? This discussion is then compounded by the reality of constrained resources. This note focuses on the comparison of retail CBDC—that is, the presence of digital central bank money available to the general public—with FPS and e-money systems from a payments perspective, and how CBDC may support a jurisdiction’s vision on payments in the digital age. The note does not seek to advocate for CBDC over an FPS or e-money. The balance of arguments for any one system may change over time, and the choice may not be mutually exclusive in many jurisdictions. In the future, it is possible to envisage the coexistence of an FPS, e-money, and CBDC in many payment landscapes across the world. Through good design, all three systems could meet central bank objectives such as payments efficiency and supporting financial inclusion; some benefits are unique to CBDC, such as maintaining access to central bank money in an increasingly digitalized age. While central banks will make choices unique to their circumstances, it remains important for central banks to establish a strategy that allows them (at minimum) to monitor trends and core benefits of multiple solutions as developments occur, to allow them to plan, adapt, and drive developments in their payments landscape.
Against the backdrop of a rapidly digitalizing world, there is a growing interest in central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) among central banks, including in the Middle East and Central Asia (ME&CA) region. This paper aims to support ME&CA policymakers in examining key questions when considering the adoption of a CBDC while underscoring the importance of country-specific analyses. This paper does not provide recommendations on CBDC issuance. Instead, it frames the discussion around the following key questions: What is a CBDC? What objectives do policymakers aim to achieve with the issuance of a CBDC? Which inefficiencies in payment systems can CBDCs address? What are the implications of CBDC issuance for financial stability and central bank operational risk? How can CBDC design help achieve policy objectives and mitigate these risks? The paper provides preliminary answers to these questions at the regional level. A survey of IMF teams and public statements from ME&CA policymakers confirm that promoting financial inclusion and making payment systems more efficient (domestic and cross-border) are the top priorities in the region. Payment services through CBDCs, if offered at a lower cost than existing alternatives, could spur competition in the payment market and help increase access to bank accounts, improve financial inclusion, and update legacy technology platforms. CBDCs may also help improve the efficiency of cross-border payment services, especially if designed to address frictions arising from a lack of payment system interoperability, complex processing of compliance checks, long transaction chains, and weak competition. At the same time, CBDCs could negatively impact bank profitability while introducing a substantial operational burden for central banks. However, the exact economic and financial impacts of CBDCs need further study and would depend on estimates of CBDC demand, which are uncertain and country- dependent. CBDC issuance and adoption is a long journey that policymakers should approach with care. Policymakers need to analyze carefully whether a CBDC serves their country’s objectives and whether the expected benefits outweigh the potential costs, in addition to risks for the financial system and operational risks for the central bank.
Digitalization of the economy provides both challenges and opportunities. Central banks should ensure that they have the capacity to continue to meet their policy objectives in the digital age. It is in this context that central bank digital currency (CBDC) should be evaluated. If designed appropriately, CBDCs could allow central banks to modernize payment systems and future-proof central bank money as the pace and shape of digitalization continues to evolve. However, the decision to proceed with CBDC exploration and an eventual launch would need to be jurisdiction specific, depending on the degree of digitalization of the economy, the legal and regulatory frameworks, and the central bank’s internal capacity. This paper proposes a dynamic decision-making framework under which the central bank can make decisions under uncertainty. A phased and iterative approach could allow central banks to adjust the pace, scale, and scope of their CBDC projects as the domestic and international environment changes.
Many central banks are currently exploring the possibility of issuing retail central bank digital currency (CBDC). While the primary objective varies between jurisdictions, many central banks consider improved cross-border payments as a potential benefit and previous work has shown that CBDC can help overcome some of the frictions in cross-border payments. CBDC is a safe and liquid asset reducing the number of financial intermediaries and the settlement risk. Designing CBDC systems for cross-border payments is not fundamentally different from tailoring other payment systems. However, the roles and responsibilities might be slightly different in a CBDC system, and the central bank may play a more pivotal role given CBDC’s nature as public money as opposed to commercial bank money. This note draws lessons from ongoing experimentation and research to identify design and policy considerations when developing retail CBDC systems so it may be compatible for cross-border payments. The note focuses on retail CBDC—a CBDC primarily targeting households and non-financial firms—and leaves wholesale CBDC considerations for future work, although many of the discussions are applicable to wholesale CBDC and other forms of money as well.
