It is widely believed that central banks have grown (the Bank of England) or were established (the Federal Reserve) to pursue the twin objectives of monetary and price stability. But why should they? Central bankers are people, too, whose behavior is presumably determined, like the rest of us, by their incentives and the information available to them. The author explores this question.
Provides an in-depth overview of the Federal Reserve System, including information about monetary policy and the economy, the Federal Reserve in the international sphere, supervision and regulation, consumer and community affairs and services offered by Reserve Banks. Contains several appendixes, including a brief explanation of Federal Reserve regulations, a glossary of terms, and a list of additional publications.
The economic influence of central banks has received ever more attention given their centrality during the financial crises that led to the Great Recession, strains in the European Union, and the challenges to the Euro. The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Central Banking reflects the state of the art in the theory and practice and covers a wide range of topics that will provide insight to students, scholars, and practitioners. As an up to date reference of the current and potential challenges faced by central banks in the conduct of monetary policy and in the search for the maintenance of financial system stability, this Oxford Handbook covers a wide range of essential issues. The first section provides insights into central bank governance, the differing degrees of central bank independence, and the internal dynamics of their decision making. The next section focuses on questions of whether central banks can ameliorate fiscal burdens, various strategies to affect monetary policy, and how the global financial crisis affected the relationship between the traditional focus on inflation targeting and unconventional policy instruments such as quantitative easing (QE), foreign exchange market interventions, negative interest rates, and forward guidance. The next two sections turn to central bank communications and management of expectations and then mechanisms of policy transmission. The fifth part explores the challenges of recent developments in the economy and debates about the roles central banks should play, focusing on micro- and macro-prudential arguments. The implications of recent developments for policy modeling are covered in the last section. The breadth and depth enhances understanding of the challenges and opportunities facing central banks.
The Evolution of Central Banks employs a wide range of historical evidence and reassesses current monetary analysis to argue that the development of non-profit-maximizing and noncompetitive central banks to supervise and regulate the commercial banking system fulfils a necessary and natural function. Goodhart surveys the case for free banking, examines the key role of the clearing house in the evolution of the central bank, and investigates bank expansion and fluctuation in the context of the clearing house mechanism. He concludes that it is the noncompetitive aspect of the central bank that is crucial to the performance of its role. Goodhart addresses the questions of deposit insurance and takes up the "club theory" approach to the central bank. Included in the historical study of their origins are 8 European central banks, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England, and the Federal Reserve Board of the United States.
Alan S. Blinder offers the dual perspective of a leading academic macroeconomist who served a stint as Vice-Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board—one who practiced what he had long preached and then returned to academia to write about it. He tells central bankers how they might better incorporate academic knowledge and thinking into the conduct of monetary policy, and he tells scholars how they might reorient their research to be more attuned to reality and thus more useful to central bankers. Based on the 1996 Lionel Robbins Lectures, this readable book deals succinctly, in a nontechnical manner, with a wide variety of issues in monetary policy. The book also includes the author's suggested solution to an age-old problem in monetary theory: what it means for monetary policy to be "neutral."
Not long ago, secrecy was the byword in central banking circles, but now the unmistakable trend is towards greater openness and transparency. This, the third Geneva Report on the World Economy, describes and evaluates some of the changes in how central banks talk to the markets, to the press, and to the public. The report first assesses the case for transparency ? defined as providing sufficient information for the public to understand the policy regime ? and concludes that it is very strong, based on both policy effectiveness and democratic accountability. It then examines what should be the content of communication and argues that central banks ought to spell out their long-run objectives and methods. It then investigates the link between the decision-making process and central bank communication, drawing a distinction between individualistic and collegial committees. The report concludes with a review of the communications strategies of some of the main central banks.
Why stable banking systems are so rare Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries—but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents. Calomiris and Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why they endure, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation.
This report by the Central Bank Governance Group presents information intended to help decision-makers set up governance arrangements that are most suitable for their own circumstances. The report draws on a large body of information on the design and operation of central banks that the BIS has brought together since it initiated work on central bank governance in the early 1990s. The need to deal with chronic inflation in the 1970s and 1980s prompted the identification of price stability as a formal central bank objective and led to a significant reworking of governance arrangements. The current global financial crisis could have equally important implications for central banks, particularly with respect to their role in fostering financial stability. Although it is too early to know how central banking will change as a result, the report takes an important first step in identifying governance questions that the crisis poses.
This book reflects on the innovations that central banks have introduced since the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers to improve their modes of intervention, regulation and resolution of financial markets and financial institutions. Authors from both academia and policy circles explore these innovations through four approaches: ‘Bank Capital Regulation’ examines the Basel III agreement; ‘Bank Resolution’ focuses on effective regimes for regulating and resolving ailing banks; ‘Central Banking with Collateral-Based Finance’ develops thought on the challenges that market-based finance pose for the conduct of central banking; and ‘Where Next for Central Banking’ examines the trajectory of central banking and its new, central role in sustaining capitalism.
This book by a leading authority on monetary policy offers a unique view of the subject from the perspectives of both scholar and practitioner. Frederic Mishkin is not only an academic expert in the field but also a high-level policymaker. He is especially well positioned to discuss the changes in the conduct of monetary policy in recent years, in particular the turn to inflation targeting. Monetary Policy Strategydescribes his work over the last ten years, offering published papers, new introductory material, and a summing up, "Everything You Wanted to Know about Monetary Policy Strategy, But Were Afraid to Ask," which reflects on what we have learned about monetary policy over the last thirty years. Mishkin blends theory, econometric evidence, and extensive case studies of monetary policy in advanced and emerging market and transition economies. Throughout, his focus is on these key areas: the importance of price stability and a nominal anch fiscal and financial preconditions for achieving price stability; central bank independence as an additional precondition; central bank accountability; the rationale for inflation targeting; the optimal inflation target; central bank transparency and communication; and the role of asset prices in monetary policy.
