Uncertainty, Pay for Performance and Adverse Selection in a Competitive Labor Market
Uncertainty, Pay for Performance and Adverse Selection in a Competitive Labor Market

Author: Felipe Balmaceda

Publisher:

Published: 2004

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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This paper develops a new rationale for the emergence of pay-for-performance contracts. The labor market is competitive, workers are risk averse and firms risk neutral. The paper shows that in stable environments more productive workers self-select into pay-for-performance jobs because risk is less costly to them than to their less productive counterparts which prefer fixed-salary contracts. When uncertainty is sufficiently large a pooling equilibrium emerges in which all workers have pay-for-performance contracts, thereby reducing more productive workers' costs of being pooled with less productive workers. The model explains several empirical regularities unaccounted for by alternative models, such as markets where all observed contracts involve pay-for-performance, and also that such markets are more likely to emerge in highly uncertain environments.

Asymmetric Information and the Market Structure of the Banking Industry
Asymmetric Information and the Market Structure of the Banking Industry

Author: Mr.Giovanni Dell'Ariccia

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 1998-06-01

Total Pages: 32

ISBN-13: 145195154X

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The paper analyzes the effects of informational asymmetries on the market structure of the banking industry in a multi-period model of spatial competition. All lenders face uncertainty with regard to borrowers’ creditworthiness, but, in the process of lending, incumbent banks gather proprietary information about their clients, acquiring an advantage over potential entrants. These informational asymmetries are an important determinant of the industry structure and may represent a barrier to entry for new banks. The paper shows that, in contrast with traditional models of horizontal differentiation, the steady-state equilibrium is characterized by a finite number of banks even in the absence of fixed costs.

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Author: Amy Finkelstein

Publisher: Columbia University Press

Published: 2014-12-02

Total Pages: 161

ISBN-13: 0231538685

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Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice

Designing Labor Market Institutions in Emerging and Developing Economies
Designing Labor Market Institutions in Emerging and Developing Economies

Author: Mr.Romain A Duval

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2019-05-21

Total Pages: 58

ISBN-13: 1498313264

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This paper discusses theoretical aspects and evidences related to designing labor market institutions in emerging market and developing economies. This note reviews the state of theory and evidence on the design of labor market institutions in a developing economy context and then reviews its consistency with actual labor market advice in a selected set of emerging and developing economies. The focus is mainly on three broad sets of institutions that matter for both workers’ protection and labor market efficiency: employment protection, unemployment insurance and social assistance, minimum wages and collective bargaining. Text mining techniques are used to identify IMF recommendations in these areas in Article IV Reports for 30 emerging and frontier economies over 2005–2016. This note has provided a critical review of the literature on the design of labor market institutions in emerging and developing market economies, and benchmarked the advice featured in IMF recommendations for 30 emerging market and frontier economies against the tentative conclusions from the literature.

Pay for Performance in Health Care
Pay for Performance in Health Care

Author: Jerry Cromwell

Publisher: RTI Press

Published: 2011-02-28

Total Pages: 388

ISBN-13: 1934831042

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This book provides a balanced assessment of pay for performance (P4P), addressing both its promise and its shortcomings. P4P programs have become widespread in health care in just the past decade and have generated a great deal of enthusiasm in health policy circles and among legislators, despite limited evidence of their effectiveness. On a positive note, this movement has developed and tested many new types of health care payment systems and has stimulated much new thinking about how to improve quality of care and reduce the costs of health care. The current interest in P4P echoes earlier enthusiasms in health policy—such as those for capitation and managed care in the 1990s—that failed to live up to their early promise. The fate of P4P is not yet certain, but we can learn a number of lessons from experiences with P4P to date, and ways to improve the designs of P4P programs are becoming apparent. We anticipate that a “second generation” of P4P programs can now be developed that can have greater impact and be better integrated with other interventions to improve the quality of care and reduce costs.

Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market
Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market

Author: George A. Akerlof

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 1986-11-28

Total Pages: 196

ISBN-13: 9780521312844

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The contributors explore the reasons why involuntary unemployment happens when supply equals demand.

Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis
Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis

Author: Peter B. Doeringer

Publisher: M.E. Sharpe

Published: 1985-06

Total Pages: 258

ISBN-13: 9780765632128

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This book discusses the institutional aspects of the American labor market. The introduction assesses the major changes since 1971.

Risk, Uncertainty and Profit
Risk, Uncertainty and Profit

Author: Frank H. Knight

Publisher: Cosimo, Inc.

Published: 2006-11-01

Total Pages: 401

ISBN-13: 1602060053

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A timeless classic of economic theory that remains fascinating and pertinent today, this is Frank Knight's famous explanation of why perfect competition cannot eliminate profits, the important differences between "risk" and "uncertainty," and the vital role of the entrepreneur in profitmaking. Based on Knight's PhD dissertation, this 1921 work, balancing theory with fact to come to stunning insights, is a distinct pleasure to read. FRANK H. KNIGHT (1885-1972) is considered by some the greatest American scholar of economics of the 20th century. An economics professor at the University of Chicago from 1927 until 1955, he was one of the founders of the Chicago school of economics, which influenced Milton Friedman and George Stigler.