This volume presents new essays investigating a difficult theoretical and practical problem: how do we find a place for individual responsibility in a theory of distributive justice? Does what we choose affect what we deserve? Would making justice sensitive to responsibility give people what they deserve? Would it advance or hinder equality?
The utlitiarian economist and Nobel Laureate John Harsanyi and the liberal egalitarian philosopher John Rawls were two of the most eminent scholars writing on problems of social justice in the last century. The contributions to this volume, addressed to an interdisciplinary audience, pay tribute to them by investigating themes that figure prominently in their work. In some cases, the contributors explore issues considered by Harsanyi and Rawls in more depth and from novel perspectives. In others, the contributors use the work of Harsanyi and Rawls as points of departure for pursuing the construction of new theories for the evaluation of social justice.
Arguments about distributive justice often take place around two ideas. One is that good should be distributed equally. The other is that how people fare in life should depend on what they are responsible for. The author asks what draws us to these two ideas and examines recent attempts by egalitarian thinkers to bring them together in a single distributive ideal. Underlying this ideal is the egalitarian intuition - the intuition that it is objectionable for some to be worse off than others through no fault of their own. in a wide-ranging discussion, Lake tests that intuition from a variety of perspectives and points to the gaps in our current thinking about quality and individual responsibility.
Samuel Freeman is a leading political philosopher and one of the foremost authorities on the works of John Rawls. Liberalism and Distributive Justice offers a series of Freeman's essays in contemporary political philosophy on three different forms of liberalism-classical liberalism, libertarianism, and the high liberal tradition--and their relation to capitalism, the welfare state, and economic justice.
Key contemporary discussions of distributive justice have formulated egalitarian approaches in terms of responsibility. But this approach, Hurley contends, has ignored the way our understanding of responsibility constrains the roles it can actually play within distributive justice.
In this lively and accessible book, Matt Matravers considers the role of responsibility in politics, morality and the law. In recent years, responsibility has taken a central place in our lives. In politics, both Tony Blair and George W. Bush have claimed that individual responsibility is at the centre of their policy agendas. In morality and the law, it seems just that people should be rewarded or punished only for things for which they are responsible. Yet responsibility is a hotly contested concept. Some philosophers claim that it is impossible, while others insist on both its possibility and importance. This debate has become increasingly technical in the philosophical literature, but it is seldom connected to our practices of politics and the law. Matravers asks, What are we doing when we hold people responsible in deciding questions of distributive justice or of punishment?. By addressing this question, he not only shows how philosophy can help in thinking about current political and legal controversies, but also how we can keep hold of the idea of responsibility in an age in which we are increasingly impressed by the roles of genetics and environment in shaping us and our characters.
John Roemer has written a unique book that critiques economists' conceptions of justice from a philosophical perspective and philosophical theories of distributive justice from an economic one.
Distributive justice has come to the fore in political philosophy in recent decades: how should we arrange our social and economic institutions so as to distribute fairly the benefits and burdens of social cooperation? Thirty-two leading figures from philosophy and political theory present specially written critical assessments of the state of research on a broad range of questions about distributive justice. The first seventeen chapters examine different views of distributive justice and its role in political philosophy, and consider some key methodological questions facing theorists of justice. The remaining fifteen chapters investigate questions about the implementation of distributive justice with regard to a range of aspects of society, including gender, race, the family, education, work, health, language, migration, and climate change. This Oxford Handbook will be a rich and authoritative resource for anyone working on theories of justice.
A central component of justice is how the economic goods are distributed in a society. Philosophers contribute to distributive justice debates by providing arguments for principles to guide and evaluate the allocation of economic goods and to guide the design of institutions to achieve more just distributions. This volume includes both seminal and recent work by philosophers, covering a range of representative positions, including libertarian, egalitarian, desert, and welfare theorists. The introduction to the volume and the selections themselves are designed to allow students and professionals to see some of the most influential pieces that have shaped the field, as well as some key critics of these positions. The articles intersect in such a way as to develop an appreciation of the types of theories and the central issues addressed by theories of distributive justice. Furthermore, the choice of authors in this collection reflects an appreciation of the influence of institutions in general, markets in particular, and even luck on the distribution of economic goods.
