Military theorists such as David Alberts contend that information technologies will allow for wider and more rapid sharing of information. In order to take advantage of the emerging possibilities presented by information technologies the theorists recommend changes to the structure of information age military organizations and changes to the methods for command and control of military forces. Some of their ideas have implications for the traditional function of command. This monograph asks how contemporary military theorists account for the essence of command in information age theories of warfare. Case studies of Frederick the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, and Dwight D. Eisenhower demonstrate that the essence of command is the dynamic relationship among nine imperatives. These imperatives include context, action, nerve, presentation, design, intellect, expertise, coherence, and the individual. The monograph contends that the emerging information age theories of warfare are flawed because they are based on a definition of command that does not account for these imperatives. The monograph serves as a warning to those who might seek to optimize an army for network centric warfare.
"In this paper, the author examines the claim that information technologies will allow for wider and more rapid sharing of information. In order to take advantage of the emerging possibilities presented by information technologies, NCW [network-centric warfare] theorists recommend changes to the structure of information age military organisations and changes to the methods for command and control of military forces. Some of their ideas have implications for the traditional function of command. This study paper asks how contemporary military theorists account for the essence of command in information age theories of warfare. Case studies of Frederick the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte and Dwight D. Eisenhower demonstrate that the essence of command is the dynamic relationship among nine imperatives. This study paper contends that the emerging information age theories of warfare are flawed because they are based on a definition of command that does not account for these imperatives."--Land Warfare Studies Centre website.
As the world enters a new millennium, the U.S. military simultaneously enters a new era in warfare -- an era in which warfare is affected by a changing strategic environment and rapid technological change. The United States and its multinational partners are experiencing a transition from the Industrial Age to the Information Age. Simultaneously, it is fully engaged in a global war on terrorism set in a new period of globalization. These changes, as well as the experiences gained during recent and ongoing military operations, have resulted in the current drive to transform the force with network-centric warfare (NCW) as the centerpiece of this effort. This document describes how the tenets and principles of NCW are providing the foundation for developing new warfighting concepts, organizations, and processes that will allow U.S. forces to maintain a competitive advantage over potential adversaries, now and in the future. In sum, the report provides an overview of the ongoing implementation of NCW in the Department of Defense (DoD). A brief description of NCW, including its origins, its central role in force transformation, its tenets and principles, and an implementation strategy, are provided in Chapter 1. An examination of NCW as an emerging theory of war, its relationship to the four domains of Information Age warfare, the growing evidence of its benefits, and the warfighting advantages it can provide are examined in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 focuses on network-centric operations (NCO), including the relationship of NCO to the overarching Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC), the NCO experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, the development of the NCO Conceptual Framework, and the conduct of NCO case studies. An overview of Joint and Service plans and initiatives to develop and implement network-centric capabilities and the growing investment in these capabilities by our allies and multinational partners are provided in Chapter 4.
Military theorists such as David Alberts contend that information technologies will allow for wider and more rapid sharing of information. In order to take advantage of the emerging possibilities presented by information technologies the theorists recommend changes to the structure of information age military organizations and changes to the methods for command and control of military forces. Some of their ideas have implications for the traditional function of command. This monograph asks how contemporary military theorists account for the essence of command in information age theories of warfare. Case studies of Frederick the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, and Dwight D. Eisenhower demonstrate that the essence of command is the dynamic relationship among nine imperatives. These imperatives include context, action, nerve, presentation, design, intellect, expertise, coherence, and the individual. The monograph contends that the emerging information age theories of warfare are flawed because they are based on a definition of command that does not account for these imperatives. The monograph serves as a warning to those who might seek to optimize an army for network centric warfare.
Provides answers to some of the fundamental questions regarding network-centric warfare (NCW) as an emerging theory of war in the Information Age. Describes how the tenets and principles of NCW are providing the foundation for developing new warfighting concepts, organizations, and processes that will allow our forces to maintain a competitive advantage over potential adversaries, now and in the future. Provides an overview of the ongoing implementation of NCW in the Department of Defense (DoD).
A report by the Dept. of Defense¿s Command and Control Research Program. Contents: (1) Complexity in Natural and Economic Systems; (2) Concepts for Warfare from Complexity Theory; (3) Evidence for Complex Emergent Behavior in Historical Data; (4) Mathematical Modeling of Complexity, Knowledge, and Conflict; (5) An Extended Example of the Dynamics of Local Collaboration and Clustering, and Some Final Thoughts. Appendix: Optimal Control with a Unique Control Solution. Tables and figures.
Since its emergence in 1998, the concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) has become a central driver behind America’s military ‘transformation’ and seems to offer the possibility of true integration between multinational military formations. Even though NCW, or variations on its themes, has been adopted by most armed services, it is a concept in operational and doctrinal development. It is shaping not only how militaries operate, but, just as importantly, what they are operating with, and potentially altering the strategic landscape. This paper examines how the current military dominance of the US over every other state means that only it has the capacity to sustain military activity on a global scale and that other states participating in US-led coalitions must be prepared to work in an ‘interoperable’ fashion. It explores the application of computer networks to military operations in conjunction with the need to secure a network’s information and to assure that it accurately represents situational reality. Drawing on an examination of how networks affected naval operations in the Persian Gulf during 2002 and 2003 as conducted by America’s Australian and Canadian coalition partners, the paper warns that in seeking allies with the requisite technological capabilities, but also those that it can trust with its information resources, the US may be heading towards a very secure digital trap.
What is Network Centric Warfare Network-centric warfare, also called network-centric operations or net-centric warfare, is a military doctrine or theory of war that aims to translate an information advantage, enabled partly by information technology, into a competitive advantage through the computer networking of dispersed forces. It was pioneered by the United States Department of Defense in the 1990s. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Network-centric warfare Chapter 2: Defense Information Systems Agency Chapter 3: United States Joint Forces Command Chapter 4: Brain–computer interface Chapter 5: Global Information Grid Chapter 6: NCOW Chapter 7: NetOps Chapter 8: Command and control Chapter 9: John J. Garstka Chapter 10: Battlespace (II) Answering the public top questions about network centric warfare. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Network Centric Warfare.
The present age widely referred to as the information age has changed the nature of wars not in degree but in kind. Warfare is no longer confined to the militaries or to the battlefields but has transcended into the civilian domain; today, it also involves the entire government infrastructure, the commercial and economic zones. Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is applicable to all levels of warfare and contributes to the coalescence of strategy, operations and tactics. It is transparent to the mission, force size, its composition and geography. NCW has many attributes which has enabled it to become as potent as it is today. These characteristics have been made possible mainly due to technology and rapid progress in every sphere which has ensured rapid computing and diminishing the tyranny of distances. While the Nuclear Age spawned a return to limited war, the Information Age has had its own unique impact on the conduct of military operations. is century has been characterised by the widespread impact of technology in many fields. Information, communications and data processing have profoundly influenced every significant aspect of human activity and have irrevocably transformed war-fighting methodology. e distinction between war and peace has blurred and is reaching the vanishing point with no definable battlefields or fronts. e distinction between "civilian" and "military" is fast disappearing as is evident from the number of cyber intrusions in the defence, scientific, banking and commercial sectors the world over. As a result, most states today are perpetually at war; a war of a different kind, not against tangible elements but against bits and bytes. Terrorism is a reality today; it is a growing menace in the civilised society and is here to stay. It has taken warfare into the civilian domain. It is difficult to predict where, when and what will be struck and, therefore, not possible to keep a standing force at all vulnerable points. is has led to wars of the present being more covert, with the adversaries learning to use the strengths of the Information Technology (IT) against the proponents. This information war is split between the offensive and the defensive. e advantage more often than not lies with the attacker who can choose the time and place of the attack. e blurring of offence and defence reflects the dual nature of NCW; it tends to defy and cut across standard boundaries, jurisdictions, and distinctions between state and society, public and private, war and peace, war and crime, civilian and military, police and military, and legal and illegal. is makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a government to assign responsibility to any single agency- e.g., military, police, or intelligence-to be in charge of responding. Sharing information and massing of forces becomes critical for quick and effective action. This book will be of immense value to not only the defence community but also to all those interested in understanding the way conflicts of the present generation affect the lives of the entire population. No particular academic background has been assumed of its readership. All arguments developed in the paper are couched in terms of concepts that are introduced in the paper.
This book argues that Network Centric Warfare (NCW) influences how developed militaries operate in the same fashion that an operating system influences the development of computer software. It examines three inter-related issues: the overwhelming military power of the United States; the growing influence of NCW on military thinking; and the centrality of coalition operations in modern military endeavours. Irrespective of terrorist threats and local insurgencies, the present international structure is remarkably stable - none of the major powers seeks to alter the system from its present liberal character, as demonstrated by the lack of a military response to US military primacy. This primacy privileges the American military doctrine and thus the importance of NCW, which promises a future of rapid, precise, and highly efficient operations, but also a future predicated on the ‘digitization’ of the battle space. Participation in future American-led military endeavours will require coalition partners to be networked: ‘interoperability’ will therefore be a key consideration of a partner’s strategic worth. Network Centric Warfare and Coalition Operations will be of great interest to students of strategic studies, international security, US foreign policy and international relations in general.
