En beskrivelse og vurdering af den tyske strategi overfor Sovjetunionen 1939-1941 herunder den tyske generalstabs (OKW) planlægning af "Operation BARBAROSSA."
Based on primary Russian and German sources, the author investigates Soviet strategy and tactics involved in the June 22, 1941 defense of their frontier against the Wehrmacht
On June 22, 1941, Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa, one of the turning points of World War II. Within six months, the invasion bogged down on the outskirts of Moscow, and the Eastern Front proved to be the decisive theater in the defeat of the Third Reich. Ever since, most historians have agreed that this was Hitler’s gravest mistake. In Hitler’s Great Gamble, James Ellman argues that while Barbarossa was a gamble and perverted by genocidal Nazi ideology, it was not doomed from the start. Rather it represented Hitler’s best chance to achieve his war aims for Germany which were remarkably similar to those of the Kaiser’s government in 1914. Other options, such as an invasion of England, or an offensive to seize the oil fields of the Middle East were considered and discarded as unlikely to lead to Axis victory. In Ellman’s recounting, Barbarossa did not fail because of flaws in the Axis invasion strategy, the size of the USSR, or the brutal cold of the Russian winter. Instead, German defeat was due to errors of Nazi diplomacy. Hitler chose not to coordinate his plans with his most militarily powerful allies, Finland and Japan, and ensure the seizure of the ports of Murmansk and Vladivostok. Had he done so, Germany might well have succeeded in defeating the Soviet Union and, perhaps, winning World War II. Drawing on a wealth of primary and secondary sources (including many recently released), Hitler’s Great Gamble is a provocative work that will appeal to a wide cross-section of World War II buffs, enthusiasts, and historians.
The relationship between Germany and Russia is Europe's most important link with the largest country on the continent. This book analyses how successive German governments from 1991 to 2014 have misread Russian intentions, until Angela Merkel sharply recalibrated German and EU policy towards Moscow.
The aim of this edition is to present in a comprehensive way the strategy and military operations of the German army in the attack on Russia in World War 2. The narrative starts with Hitler's initial plans for an invasion of Russia and ends at the time of Germany's maximum territorial gains during the battle for Stalingrad. Contents: Strategic Planning Operational Planning The Initial Operations (22 June-31 July 1941) Planning for Future Operations The Diversion and Reassembly The German Attack on Moscow The Russian Counteroffensive (December 1941-February 1942) Preliminary Planning for a German Offensive in the Caucasus, 1942 Preparations for the German Summer Offensive Initial Operations and New Plans (July 1942) The Period of Stagnation (August-October 1942) Critical Analysis of the German Summer Offensive in 1942 List of German Military Leaders (July 1940-November 1942) Chronology of the Events
This study examines the determinants and character of German policies toward the Soviet non-Russian nationalities and their effects on the Soviet and German war efforts and on the nationalities themselves. Particular emphasis is placed on the analysis of the nature and magnitude of military collaboration with the Germans by the non-Russian nationalities, in an attempt to examine the military exploitability of the political warfare opportunities that presented themselves. Section II outlines the attitudes toward the Soviet nationalities prevalent among the Nazi leadership and the role envisaged for them in a postwar German-dominated Europe, and juxtaposes them on the views of German officials who did not share Nazi dogma and advocated a more pragmatic approach. German policies in the occupied non-Russian territories and their implications are examined in Sec. III. Section IV describes the different types and degrees of military collaboration with the Germans. The main conclusions are summarized in Sec. V.