The recommendations of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission will automatically take effect unless, within a stated period after the recommendations are submitted to the House and Senate, Congress adopts a joint resolution of disapproval rejecting them in their entirety. Congressional consideration of this disapproval resolution is not governed by the regular rules of the House and Senate, but by special expedited or "fast track" procedures laid out in statute. This report describes these expedited parliamentary procedures and explains how they differ from the regular legislative processes of Congress. This report will be updated as needed.
The recommendations of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission will automatically take effect unless, within a stated period after the recommendations are submitted to the House and Senate, Congress adopts a joint resolution of disapproval rejecting them in their entirety. Congressional consideration of this disapproval resolution is not governed by the regular rules of the House and Senate, but by special expedited or "fast track" procedures laid out in statute. This report describes these expedited parliamentary procedures and explains how they differ from the regular legislative processes of Congress. This report will be updated as needed. See [http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/is-defense.shtml] for additional information on military base closures.
In 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005, an independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission was authorized by law to recommend the disposal of unneeded defense facilities throughout the United States. Recently, the Department of Defense (DOD) formally asked Congress to provide it with statutory authority to conduct another round of base closures and realignments in 2015. Under the terms of the statutes which authorized these previous BRAC rounds, as well as under the new authority requested by the DOD for 2015, the BRAC Commission's recommendations automatically take effect unless, within a stated period after the recommendations are approved by the President and submitted to the House and Senate, a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted rejecting them in their entirety. Congressional consideration of this disapproval resolution is not governed by the standing rules of the House and Senate, but by special expedited or "fast track" parliamentary procedures laid out in statute. This report describes these expedited parliamentary procedures and explains how they differ from the regular legislative processes of Congress.
This report focuses on lessons learned from the base realignment and closure rounds held in 1988,1991,1993, and 1995. We undertook this work so that a systematic assessment of experiences would be available should the Department of Defense (DOD) request and Congress authorize additional base closure rounds. In transmitting the results of the 1997 Defense Quadrennial Review to Congress on May 19,1997, the Secretary of Defense stated his intent to ask Congress to authorize two additional base closure rounds. We are addressing this report to you in keeping with our practice of reporting to Congress on the recommendations and selection process employed by DOD in each of the three most recent base closure rounds, as initially required by the 1990 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act (P.L. 101-510). We have identified lessons related to savings, costs, and economic impact and improvements needed in DOD's process for identifying bases for realignment and closure. We have also included matters for congressional consideration if Congress contemplates legislation for future base closure rounds.
Is the United States Congress dead, alive, or trapped in a moribund cycle? When confronted with controversial policy issues, members of Congress struggle to satisfy conflicting legislative, representative, and oversight duties. These competing goals, along with the pressure to satisfy local constituents, cause members of Congress to routinely cede power on a variety of policies, express regret over their loss of control, and later return to the habit of delegating their power. This pattern of institutional ambivalence undermines conventional wisdom about congressional party resurgence, the power of oversight, and the return of the so-called imperial presidency. In Congressional Ambivalence, Jasmine Farrier examines Congress's frequent delegation of power by analyzing primary source materials such as bills, committee reports, and the Congressional Record. Farrier demonstrates that Congress is caught between abdication and ambition and that this ambivalence affects numerous facets of the legislative process. Explaining specific instances of post-delegation disorder, including Congress's use of new bills, obstruction, public criticism, and oversight to salvage its lost power, Farrier exposes the tensions surrounding Congress's roles in recent hot-button issues such as base-closing commissions, presidential trade promotion authority, and responses to the attacks of September 11. She also examines shifting public rhetoric used by members of Congress as they emphasize, in institutionally self-conscious terms, the difficulties of balancing their multiple roles. With a deep understanding of the inner workings of the federal government, Farrier illuminates a developing trend in the practice of democracy.
Between 1988 and 1995, the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission closed down 97 bases and realigned over 350 other bases. A hot button topic in the military field, base-closings is an important issue that affects not only soldiers, but ordinary citizens as well. Due to their massive economic significance for local and regional communities, military bases impact thousands of people, and thus encompass various political interests between local, state, and national levels. This reference work investigates the politics and key political figures involved in base-closing decisions, and considers various reasons why bases have been and continue to be closed down. An overview of the U.S. military base infrastructure as well as primary documents is included to help students understand the BRAC Commission process between 1988-2005. The book also analyzes the closure of overseas bases outside of the BRAC process. Ideal for high school, undergraduate, and graduate students, this comprehensive handbook is the only complete reference guide to military base closings. Between 1988 and 1995, the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission closed down 97 bases and realigned over 350 other bases. A hot button topic in the military field, base-closings is an important issue that affects not only soldiers, but ordinary citizens as well. Due to their massive economic significance for local and regional communities, military bases impact thousands of people, and thus encompass various political interests between local, state, and national levels. This reference work investigates the politics and key political figures involved in base-closing decisions, and considers various reasons why bases have been and continue to be closed down. An overview of the U.S. military base infrastructure as well as primary documents are included to help students understand the BRAC Commission process between 1988-2005. Ideal for high school, undergraduate, and graduate students, this comprehensive handbook is the only complete reference guide to military base closings.
In The Modern Legislative Veto, Michael J. Berry uses a multimethod research design, incorporating quantitative and qualitative analyses, to examine the ways that Congress has used the legislative veto over the past 80 years. This parliamentary maneuver, which delegates power to the executive but grants the legislature a measure of control over the implementation of the law, raises troubling questions about the fundamental principle of separation of governmental powers. Berry argues that, since the U.S. Supreme Court declared the legislative veto unconstitutional in Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) v. Chadha (1983), Congress has strategically modified its use of the veto to give more power to appropriations committees. Using an original dataset of legislative veto enactments, Berry finds that Congress has actually increased its use of this oversight mechanism since Chadha, especially over defense and foreign policy issues. Democratic and Republican presidents alike have fought back by vetoing legislation containing legislative vetoes and by using signing statements with greater frequency to challenge the legislative veto’s constitutionality. A complementary analysis of state-level use of the legislative veto finds variation in oversight powers granted to state legislatures, but similar struggles between the legislature and the executive. This ongoing battle over the legislative veto points to broader efforts by legislative and executive actors to control policy, efforts that continually negotiate how the democratic republic established by the Constitution actually operates in practice.
