This book brings together 11 pairs of opposing speeches on foreign policy written by Florentine statesman and historian Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540), freshly translated with new commentary. Collectively, they constitute a remarkable collection of debates on war, peace, alliance and more. Incisive and elegant, the debates contain an early formulation of concepts such as the balance of power and the security dilemma - ideas that are still in international politics today. This book highlights the importance of Guicciardini's work for the evolution of international theory and explains why he, alongside Machiavelli, should be considered a leading figure of Realism.
As US power grew after WWI, officials and nonprofits joined to promote citizen participation in world affairs. David Allen traces the rise and fall of the Foreign Policy Association, a public-education initiative that retreated in the atomic age, scuttling dreams of democratic foreign policy and solidifying the technocratic national security model.
The contributors to this book discuss the new conjunctions that have emerged between foreign policy events and politicized expressions of Russian nationalism since 2005. The 2008 war with Georgia, as well as conflicts with Ukraine and other East European countries over the memory of the Soviet Union, and the Russian interpretation of the 2005 French riots have all contributed to reinforcing narratives of Russia as a fortress surrounded by aggressive forces, in the West and CIS. This narrative has found support not only in state structures, but also within the larger public. It has been especially salient for some nationalist youth movements, including both pro-Kremlin organizations, such as "Nashi," and extra-systemic groups, such as those of the skinheads. These various actors each have their own specific agendas; they employ different modes of public action, and receive unequal recognition from other segments of society. Yet many of them expose a reading of certain foreign policy events which is roughly similar to that of various state structures. These and related phenomena are analyzed, interpreted and contextualized in papers by Luke March, Igor Torbakov, Jussi Lassila, Marlène Laruelle, and Lukasz Jurczyszyn.
As new presidential administrations come into power, they each bring their own approach to foreign policy. No grand strategy, however, is going to be completely novel. New administrations never start with a blank slate, so it is always possible to see similarities between an administration and its predecessors. Conversely, since each administration faces novel problems and operates in a unique context, no foreign policy strategy is going to be an exact replica of its predecessors. In American Pendulum, Christopher Hemmer examines America's grand strategic choices between 1914 and 2014 using four recurring debates in American foreign policy as lenses. First, how should the United States balance the trade-offs between working alone versus working with other states and international organizations? Second, what is the proper place of American values in foreign policy? Third, where does the strategic perimeter of the United States lie? And fourth, is time on the side of the United States or of its enemies?Offering new readings of debates within the Wilson, Truman, Nixon, Bush, and Obama administrations, Hemmer asserts that heated debates, disagreements, and even confusions over U.S. grand strategy are not only normal but also beneficial. He challenges the claim that uncertainties or inconsistences about the nation's role in the world or approach to security issues betray strategic confusion or the absence of a grand strategy. American foreign policy, he states, is most in danger not when debates are at their most pointed but when the weight of opinion crushes dissent. As the United States looks ahead to an increasingly multipolar world with increasing complicated security issues, Hemmer concludes, developing an effective grand strategy requires ongoing contestation and compromises between competing visions and policies.
A new history explains how and why, as it prepared to enter World War II, the United States decided to lead the postwar world. For most of its history, the United States avoided making political and military commitments that would entangle it in European-style power politics. Then, suddenly, it conceived a new role for itself as the world’s armed superpower—and never looked back. In Tomorrow, the World, Stephen Wertheim traces America’s transformation to the crucible of World War II, especially in the months prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. As the Nazis conquered France, the architects of the nation’s new foreign policy came to believe that the United States ought to achieve primacy in international affairs forevermore. Scholars have struggled to explain the decision to pursue global supremacy. Some deny that American elites made a willing choice, casting the United States as a reluctant power that sloughed off “isolationism” only after all potential competitors lay in ruins. Others contend that the United States had always coveted global dominance and realized its ambition at the first opportunity. Both views are wrong. As late as 1940, the small coterie of officials and experts who composed the U.S. foreign policy class either wanted British preeminence in global affairs to continue or hoped that no power would dominate. The war, however, swept away their assumptions, leading them to conclude that the United States should extend its form of law and order across the globe and back it at gunpoint. Wertheim argues that no one favored “isolationism”—a term introduced by advocates of armed supremacy in order to turn their own cause into the definition of a new “internationalism.” We now live, Wertheim warns, in the world that these men created. A sophisticated and impassioned narrative that questions the wisdom of U.S. supremacy, Tomorrow, the World reveals the intellectual path that brought us to today’s global entanglements and endless wars.
Designed to accompany the survey text Early Modern England: 1485-1714, this updated and expanded Sourcebook brings together an impressive array of Tudor-Stuart documents and illustrations, as well as extensive bibliographies and research and discussion guides. New edition contains 50 new documents, more explanatory text, illustrations, biographical background, and study questions Wide range of documents, from both manuscript and print sources, and from transcripts of private and public life Editorial material introduces students to the critical context; chapter bibliographies and questions allow ready integration into classroom, and research and source analysis assignments. Bibliography of Historians’ Debates with the latest articles and essays Accompanies the survey text Early Modern England: 1485-1714 Click here for more discussion and debate on the authors’ blogspot: http://earlymodernengland.blogspot.com/ [Wiley disclaims all responsibility and liability for the content of any third-party websites that can be linked to from this website. Users assume sole responsibility for accessing third-party websites and the use of any content appearing on such websites. Any views expressed in such websites are the views of the authors of the content appearing on those websites and not the views of Wiley or its affiliates, nor do they in any way represent an endorsement by Wiley or its affiliates.]
After 1989, the function of transitional governance changed. It became a process whereby transitional authorities introduce a constitutional transformation on the basis of interim laws. In spite of its domestic nature, it also became an international project and one with formidable ambitions: ending war, conflict or crisis by reconfiguring the state order. This model attracted international attention, from the UN Security Council and several regional organisations, and became a playing field of choice in international politics and diplomacy. Also without recourse to armed force, international actors could impact a state apparatus – through state renaissance. This book zooms in on the non-forcible aspects of conflict-related transitional governance while focusing on the transition itself. This study shows that neither transitional actors nor external actors must respect specific rules when realising or contributing to state renaissance. The legal limits to indirectly provoking regime change are also being unveiled.
