Coordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
Author: Sandeep Baliga
Publisher:
Published: 2000
Total Pages: 22
ISBN-13:
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Cheap Talk, Information, and Coordination - Experimental Evidence
Author: Gary Charness
Publisher:
Published: 2001
Total Pages: 0
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKCostless and non-binding pre-play communication (cheap talk) has been found to often be effective in achieving efficient outcomes in experimental games. However, in previous two-player experimental games each player was informed about both his payoff and the action of the other player in the pair. In the field, people may engage in cheap talk and subsequently learn their payoffs, but frequently only learn their own payoffs and not the actions of other people. We model this uncertainty in the framework of a 2x2 coordination game, in which one choice leads to the same payoff regardless of the action of the other player. We vary whether messages about intended play are permitted, and whether participants are informed about the other person's play. Cheap talk is found to be effective, as there is much more coordination in both Signal treatments than in either of the No Signal treatments. We also find that information about the other person's play appears to increase coordination when messages are permitted. However, in the No Signal treatments, the round-to-round changes in choices induced by this additional information are unable to overcome the apparent pessimism about the feasibility of coordination without a signal.
Communication and Coordination
Author:
Publisher:
Published: 2007
Total Pages:
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKWe study costless pre-play communication of intentions among inexperienced players. Using the level-k model of strategic thinking to describe players' beliefs, we fully characterize the effects of pre-play communication in symmetric 2×2 games. One-way communication weakly increases coordination on Nash equilibrium outcomes, although average payoffs sometimes decrease. Two-way communication further improves payoffs in some games, but is detrimental in others. Moving beyond the class of symmetric 2×2 games, we find that communication facilitates coordination in common interest games with positive spillovers and strategic complementarities, but there are also games in which any type of communication hampers coordination. -- Pre-play communication ; cheap talk ; coordination ; level-k ; cognitive hierarchy
Econophysics & Economics of Games, Social Choices and Quantitative Techniques
Author: Banasri Basu
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Published: 2010-06-01
Total Pages: 394
ISBN-13: 8847015014
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe combined efforts of the Physicists and the Economists in recent years in analyzing and modelling various dynamic phenomena in monetary and social systems have led to encouraging developments, generally classified under the title of Econophysics. These developments share a common ambition with the already established field of Quantitative Economics. This volume intends to offer the reader a glimpse of these two parallel initiatives by collecting review papers written by well-known experts in the respective research frontiers in one cover. This massive book presents a unique combination of research papers contributed almost equally by Physicists and Economists. Additional contributions from Computer Scientists and Mathematicians are also included in this volume. The book consists of two parts: the first part concentrates on Econophysics problems and the second part stresses on various quantitative issues in Economics. Both parts specialize on frontier problems in Games and Social Choices.
Journal of Economic Theory
Author: Karl Shell
Publisher:
Published: 2002
Total Pages: 1098
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe Theory of Economic Policy in a Strategic Context
Author: Nicola Acocella
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2013
Total Pages: 367
ISBN-13: 1107023866
DOWNLOAD EBOOKA new unified theory of economic policy which responds to conflicts between strategic public and private policymakers.
The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis
Author: Sanjit Dhami
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2019-07-03
Total Pages: 459
ISBN-13: 0192586513
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis fourth volume of The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis covers behavioral game theory. It is an essential guide for advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students seeking a concise and focused text on this important subject, and examines the evidence on classical game theory and several models of behavioral game theory, including level-k and cognitive hierarchy models, quantal response equilibrium, and psychological game theory. This updated extract from Dhami's leading textbook allows the reader to pursue subsections of this vast and rapidly growing field and to tailor their reading to their specific interests in behavioural economics.
R & D, Innovation and Industrial Structure
Author: Boris Maurer
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Published: 2012-12-06
Total Pages: 167
ISBN-13: 3642959253
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe common topic of this collection of studies is the interaction between innova tive activity of firms and industrial structure. I call this interaction technological competition. Firms invest into R&D in order to open up new or enlarge existing profit opportuni ties for the future. A successful R&D-project leads to an innovation. An innovation introduced into the market changes the competitive structure of the industry. At the same time the structure of the industry shapes the incentives to invest into R&D. What matters for these incentives is not so much the existing structure but the expected dynamic evolution of that industry which is again dependent on the innovative choice of firms. Amongst other things, the dynamic of industry evolution is therefore rooted in the dynamics of ongoing innovative activity. Of course, this is not always the whole sto ry. There are (more or less) exogenous factors, like knowledge spillovers from other sectors of the economy, technological breakthroughs in basic research that directly influence the state of competition in an industry by providing additional profit op portunities, etc. The same is true for exogenous changes in upstream markets or demand conditions. My main interest here is not primarily to understand these exogenous forces, but to develop a theory of how the process of firms' innovative activity is shaped by competition and in turn shapes future competition between firms in an industry.
Capitalism without Capital
Author: Jonathan Haskel
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2018-10-16
Total Pages: 292
ISBN-13: 0691183295
DOWNLOAD EBOOKEarly in the twenty-first century, a quiet revolution occurred. For the first time, the major developed economies began to invest more in intangible assets, like design, branding, and software, than in tangible assets, like machinery, buildings, and computers. For all sorts of businesses, the ability to deploy assets that one can neither see nor touch is increasingly the main source of long-term success. But this is not just a familiar story of the so-called new economy. Capitalism without Capital shows that the growing importance of intangible assets has also played a role in some of the larger economic changes of the past decade, including the growth in economic inequality and the stagnation of productivity. Jonathan Haskel and Stian Westlake explore the unusual economic characteristics of intangible investment and discuss how an economy rich in intangibles is fundamentally different from one based on tangibles. Capitalism without Capital concludes by outlining how managers, investors, and policymakers can exploit the characteristics of an intangible age to grow their businesses, portfolios, and economies.
