Cheap Talk, Price Announcements, and Collusive Coordination
Author: William Irwin Gillespie
Publisher:
Published: 1995
Total Pages: 32
ISBN-13:
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Author: William Irwin Gillespie
Publisher:
Published: 1995
Total Pages: 32
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: William H. Gillespie
Publisher:
Published: 1995
Total Pages: 17
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DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Joseph E. Harrington Jr
Publisher:
Published: 2020
Total Pages: 0
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKA theory is developed to explain how sellers can effectively collude by coordinating on list prices (or surcharges), while leaving sellers to set their final prices. List prices are interpreted to be cheap talk announcements about cost information unknown to buyers. Buyers use those announcements to decide whom to invite to their procurement auction and the reserve price to set. By coordinating on a high list price to signal high cost, sellers produce supracompetitive prices by inducing buyers to be less aggressive, as reflected in a higher reserve price. We show that collusion can raise social welfare.
Author: Alexander Raskovich
Publisher:
Published: 2006
Total Pages: 46
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DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Andrew Ronald Dick
Publisher:
Published: 2002
Total Pages: 46
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DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Sheldon Kimmel
Publisher:
Published: 1996
Total Pages: 36
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DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Colin M. Campbell
Publisher:
Published: 1996
Total Pages: 46
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DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Gregory Werden
Publisher:
Published: 1996
Total Pages: 66
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DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Gregory Werden
Publisher:
Published: 1995
Total Pages: 42
ISBN-13:
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