State and local economic development policies are often created with the goal of stimulating local economic activity through employment growth. The success of these policies is commonly measured by the number of jobs they create. Because labor markets are not bound by county lines, commuting and migration are important factors to consider when measuring employment growth in a region. This study used county-level data from the 2000 Census to predict labor force participation, unemployment, in-commuting, and out-commuting. The model was estimated using Ordinary Least Squares regression and was simulated to predict changes in labor force, unemployment and commuting as a result of a change in employment for all 105 Kansas counties. An increase in employment was found to increase the labor force participation, in-commuting, and unemployment, while decreasing the number of out-commuters. The increase in in-commuting causes many of the economic benefits expected to accrue to the county where the job growth occurred to be essentially exported to the county where the in-commuters live. Failure to account for the proportion of new jobs filled by in-commuters would lead to significant over estimations of local impacts of employment growth. These results suggest that regional coordination of economic development policies, through the use of tools such as tax-base sharing, would provide substantial gains to otherwise competing local governments.
The recent recession has brought fiscal policy back to the forefront, with economists and policy makers struggling to reach a consensus on highly political issues like tax rates and government spending. At the heart of the debate are fiscal multipliers, whose size and sensitivity determine the power of such policies to influence economic growth. Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis focuses on the effects of fiscal stimuli and increased government spending, with contributions that consider the measurement of the multiplier effect and its size. In the face of uncertainty over the sustainability of recent economic policies, further contributions to this volume discuss the merits of alternate means of debt reduction through decreased government spending or increased taxes. A final section examines how the short-term political forces driving fiscal policy might be balanced with aspects of the long-term planning governing monetary policy. A direct intervention in timely debates, Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis offers invaluable insights about various responses to the recent financial crisis.
In the United States, some populations suffer from far greater disparities in health than others. Those disparities are caused not only by fundamental differences in health status across segments of the population, but also because of inequities in factors that impact health status, so-called determinants of health. Only part of an individual's health status depends on his or her behavior and choice; community-wide problems like poverty, unemployment, poor education, inadequate housing, poor public transportation, interpersonal violence, and decaying neighborhoods also contribute to health inequities, as well as the historic and ongoing interplay of structures, policies, and norms that shape lives. When these factors are not optimal in a community, it does not mean they are intractable: such inequities can be mitigated by social policies that can shape health in powerful ways. Communities in Action: Pathways to Health Equity seeks to delineate the causes of and the solutions to health inequities in the United States. This report focuses on what communities can do to promote health equity, what actions are needed by the many and varied stakeholders that are part of communities or support them, as well as the root causes and structural barriers that need to be overcome.
The COVID-19 pandemic is transforming the global economy and significantly shifting workforce demand, requiring quick, adaptive responses. The pandemic has revealed the vulnerabilities of many organizations and regional economies, and it has accelerated trends that could lead to significant improvements in productivity, performance, and resilience, which will enable organizations and regions to thrive in the next normal. To explore how communities around the United States are addressing workforce issues laid bare by the COVID-19 pandemic and how they are taking advantage of local opportunities to expand their science, technology, engineering, mathematics, and medicine (STEMM) workforces to position them for success going forward, the Board of Higher Education and Workforce of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine convened a series of workshops to identify immediate and near-term regional STEMM workforce needs in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. The workshop planning committee identified five U.S. cities and their associated metropolitan areas - Birmingham, Alabama; Boston, Massachusetts; Richmond, Virginia; Riverside, California; and Wichita, Kansas - to host workshops highlighting promising practices that communities can use to respond urgently and appropriately to their STEMM workforce needs. A sixth workshop discussed how the lessons learned during the five region-focused workshops could be applied in other communities to meet STEMM workforce needs. This proceedings of a virtual workshop series summarizes the presentations and discussions from the six public workshops that made up the virtual workshop series and highlights the key points raised during the presentations, moderated panel discussions and deliberations, and open discussions among the workshop participants.
Officially over in 2009, the Great Recession is now generally acknowledged to be the most devastating global economic crisis since the Great Depression. As a result of the crisis, the United States lost more than 7.5 million jobs, and the unemployment rate doubled—peaking at more than 10 percent. The collapse of the housing market and subsequent equity market fluctuations delivered a one-two punch that destroyed trillions of dollars in personal wealth and made many Americans far less financially secure. Still reeling from these early shocks, the U.S. economy will undoubtedly take years to recover. Less clear, however, are the social effects of such economic hardship on a U.S. population accustomed to long periods of prosperity. How are Americans responding to these hard times? The Great Recession is the first authoritative assessment of how the aftershocks of the recession are affecting individuals and families, jobs, earnings and poverty, political and social attitudes, lifestyle and consumption practices, and charitable giving. Focused on individual-level effects rather than institutional causes, The Great Recession turns to leading experts to examine whether the economic aftermath caused by the recession is transforming how Americans live their lives, what they believe in, and the institutions they rely on. Contributors Michael Hout, Asaf Levanon, and Erin Cumberworth show how job loss during the recession—the worst since the 1980s—hit less-educated workers, men, immigrants, and factory and construction workers the hardest. Millions of lost industrial jobs are likely never to be recovered and where new jobs are appearing, they tend to be either high-skill positions or low-wage employment—offering few opportunities for the middle-class. Edward Wolff, Lindsay Owens, and Esra Burak examine the effects of the recession on housing and wealth for the very poor and the very rich. They find that while the richest Americans experienced the greatest absolute wealth loss, their resources enabled them to weather the crisis better than the young families, African Americans, and the middle class, who experienced the most disproportionate loss—including mortgage delinquencies, home foreclosures, and personal bankruptcies. Lane Kenworthy and Lindsay Owens ask whether this recession is producing enduring shifts in public opinion akin to those that followed the Great Depression. Surprisingly, they find no evidence of recession-induced attitude changes toward corporations, the government, perceptions of social justice, or policies aimed at aiding the poor. Similarly, Philip Morgan, Erin Cumberworth, and Christopher Wimer find no major recession effects on marriage, divorce, or cohabitation rates. They do find a decline in fertility rates, as well as increasing numbers of adult children returning home to the family nest—evidence that suggests deep pessimism about recovery. This protracted slump—marked by steep unemployment, profound destruction of wealth, and sluggish consumer activity—will likely continue for years to come, and more pronounced effects may surface down the road. The contributors note that, to date, this crisis has not yet generated broad shifts in lifestyle and attitudes. But by clarifying how the recession’s early impacts have—and have not—influenced our current economic and social landscape, The Great Recession establishes an important benchmark against which to measure future change.
